BY PROF. N. SRINIVASAN
(Andhra University, Waltair.)
The evolution of the politics of the League constitutes a curious episode in the contemporary history of India. Under the aggressive leadership of Mr. Jinnah, once its bitterest critic, as he is now of the Congress, the League has increased the catalogue of grievances of the Muslims and has moved from one extreme position to another till at last it stands forth as the champion of separate homelands for the Muslim "nation" in the north- west and north-east of India, and the setting up of independent states. The partition of India is the utmost that can be demanded as a "safeguard" for any community in India. With the demand for Pakistan, communalism must be said to have reached its logical and absurd limits. The League boldly challenges a continuous development of our history under Hindu, Muslim and British rulers for well over two thousand years. Pakistan is the last and desperate remedy for the much advertised tyranny of the majority in India, which the League offers as the most constructive approach to the problem of the Indian constitution.
It is necessary to follow the evolution of the League’s politics since Provincial autonomy came into being, for a correct appreciation of its present position. Its politics appear to have been based on the rejection of a common political life for the peoples of India and of the principles of democracy. Without this assumption it would be difficult to explain the tone and trend of the League’s politics in the recent past, its increasing demands and successive shifts of position.
In the elections for the Provincial Legislatures under the new constitution, the League won a dominant position in only two of the Provinces of India, the Punjab and Bengal. In the pre-dominantly Muslim zone of the North West, in Sind and the North West Frontier Province, curiously it failed to make much headway. Elsewhere where the Hindus form the bulk of the population its position was that of a microscopic minority1. In two provinces it was able to form stable ministries with the Congress as the chief opposition group. It was natural under the Parliamentary system for the League to be left as an opposition minority in most of the other Provinces, in view of the exclusively communal basis of its organisation and its refusal to co-operate with other parties on a common political platform.
The obvious course for any religious group is not to isolate itself as an exclusive political body but to merge itself with the purely political parties drawn from other religious groups on the basis of a common economic and political programme unless it desires to commit political suicide. Such an union with political parties drawn from divergent religious and racial groups is the best safeguard for the religious as well as other rights of a minority. It affords the members of the minority groups the opportunities of leadership and service in the larger community and the chances of office as well as honour. By accepting the postulates of a common political life and the fundamental principles of democratic government and organisation of non-denominational political parties a minority can win for itself a unique place in public life. The members of the League, on the contrary insisted on their exclusive communal character and divergent programmes, and at the same time claimed office as a matter of right as a minority. This was very much like asking that a majority returned at an election must sacrifice its programmes approved by the people and accept to be bound by the League’s dictation, and would have completely defeated the purposes of responsible government. By its exclusiveness the League condemned its members where it was in a minority and the members of other groups where the latter happened to be the minority to a position of permanent opposition.
The interpretation of the exclusion from office under Provincial autonomy and the programmes of the majorities in terms of the community has had very unfortunate results. The opposition has been unable to build up an alternative programme and a party to take its turn as the government when the time arrives as it must. Its criticisms have inevitably tended to be exaggerated, sometimes to the point of ludicrousness. Every measure has become an attack on the minority’s cherished rights even when its connection with the minority is very remote, such as the Sales Tax and Tobacco-tax in Madras. There has been a needless admixture of religion and politics, which has only served to weaken the League’s case for the recognition of the rights of minorities to a just share of power under the new order.
It was indeed natural for the members of the League to feel disappointed and discouraged at this prospect of a permanent opposition. But the causes they ascribed to it, the ‘Hindu communalism’ of the Congress, the Assurances which Mr. Jinnah described as Victory No.1 of the Congress, presumably because it enabled the Congress, in his opinion, to constitute the Ministries without the representatives of the Muslim League, and the alleged alliance between the Congress and the British Government are very far from the being the true reasons2. Firstly the Congress is not in theory or in fact a communal organisation. There was no ministry of the Congress in which the Muslims were not represented. Secondly the assurances did not apply to the powers of the Governors for the safeguarding of the minorities. Finally the alliance of the Congress with the Government is pure fiction.
The root cause of this danger was the rejection by the members of the League of the fundamental postulate of parliamentary government, of government by the political party which wins a majority at an election on the basis of programme. In other words the root cause was the strictly communal basis of its organisation. Without accepting a common political life and subscribing to a programme which a member of the minority community has as much right to shape, to insist upon office can be only construed as an attempt to wreck the programme. To insist on composite or coalition cabinets is merely to render responsible government useless to the people. We can and ought to have governments whose personnel is composite or drawn from the various groups constituting the body politic; but a government with a composite programme or conflicting policies is a useless absurdity. Yet this was what the League insisted upon in our Provincial government as a safe guard for minorities. 3
Failing to obtain the coalitions or non-party cabinets or to prevent the establishment of responsible government in the Provinces where it happened to be a minority, the League began a new agitation. Mr. Jinnah proclaimed the failure of the Parliamentary system of government in the "Congress Provinces". He made the discovery, after turning the first few pages of the report of the Joint Parliamentary Select Committee, that India is not homogeneous and is inhabited by a number of nationalities varying so much among themselves as to constitute different nations. To apply a common political system to such disparate entities as are to be found in this country was, according to Mr. Jinnah, the root cause of all our constitutional ills. The criticism applied only to the Congress Provinces and not to Punjab and Bengal where the League’s spokesmen were leading the Governments. This is rather curious since it is in these provinces that the communal problem if particularly acute and the communities are more evenly balanced. One should have thought that the working of the system of parliamentary government would be infinitely more difficult here than elsewhere in India.
A systematic campaign began to "prove" that the Congress Provinces had misused the opportunities of responsible government to oppress the minorities, and parliamentary government had failed in them. The campaign was conducted with an extraordinary lack of courtesy to the opponents and lack of regard for truth. Political ethics and the morality of public discussion were cast to the winds. The League seems to have acted on the principle that any stick is good to beat the Congress with. Its one aim was to discredit the Congress and the means did not matter in the least. First came the story of the atrocities, broadcast with an astonishing flippancy all over the country from the platform and the press. It is revealing that the stories were spread first and then a committee was appointed to collect the evidence to support the stories. The Committee toured the country and prepared a book of grievances. The report itself was not given any publicity. A suggestion for a joint enquiry by the President of the Congress was put off by Mr. Huq. A proposal for arbitration was summarily rejected by Mr. Jinnah who stated that he had placed the matter in the hands of the Viceroy. Finally Mr. Jinnah made the preposterous suggestion for a Royal Commission to enquire into the "misdeeds" of the responsible ministers in the Congress Provinces. Mr. Jinnah must have been sure that no Commission would be appointed when he made the suggestion.
Turn to the ‘Kulturkampf’ alleged to have been carried out by Congress ministries. Hindi, Bande Mataram, the National Flag, the Wardha Scheme of education, the Charka and non-violence have been described as the means of this alleged attempt to undermine the culture of the Muslims of India. Even though these have no association with religion, the criticisms of the League have led to significant modifications. A few facts, however, must be noted before they are condemned. Hindi in Madras did not apply to Muslims schools and to Muslim boys, and the texts prescribed have won the praise of prominent members of the Muslim League itself in the Province. The objectionable portions of the Bande Mataram have been omitted, and it was directed that the Flag should not be displayed even if there was a single dissentient voice in any public building. The Wardha scheme is a novel experiment in education and certainly not directed against any community. Nor can the Charka be described as anti-Muslim, even though it certainly is not quite in line with modern scientific progress. It is merely symbol, and from an economic point of view not quite so useless as some would think. In a poor country like ours it has definite advantages. Nor can it be maintained that Muslims do not benefit from it. Finally the opposition to non-violence is quite incomprehensible in view of the fact that a public life of reason would be impossible in India without preaching it in view of a tense communal atmosphere. The world has not yet proved the efficacy of violence in effecting social change. In any case here were items in a much larger programme which were open to criticism and amendment if the League’s members chose the path of co-operation. It is further to be noted that the criticisms of the League have been purely negative. No alternative programme has been suggested by it.
The finale of this immoderate campaign of vilification was the Day of Deliverance ordered, to be kept, by Mr. Jinnah on his followers on the 22nd December, 1939, on the occasion of the resignation of the Congress Ministries and on the eve of his talks with Mr. Nehru for a communal settlement. That the end of self-government in the greater part of India should have been thought a fit occasion for the celebration of a day of deliverance from unproven if not untrue evils and of thanksgiving to God, brings out clearly the solicitude of the League for the principles of self-government for India. It is certain that the masses who follow Mr. Jinnah would soon realise if they have not already done so that the "tyranny" of their elected representatives is far more to be preferred to the strange "freedom" of bureaucratic rule which the League urged them to welcome with a Day of Deliverance.
Two significant developments in the policies of the League must be referred to as they bring out the latest tendencies towards Fascism and the complete disregard for the principles of democracy of the League, and the potentialities for evil in them. One in the protection afforded by the League to the militant organisation of the Khaksars, which has visions of a theocratic State to be achieved by means of violence. While the Congress was in office the organisation gave no end of trouble to the U. P. Government with the support of the League. Nor has the League condemned violence on the part of its own volunteers even when it has resulted in murder.4 This is most unfortunate since such an attitude on the part of the leaders will convert our public life into fratrical strife.
The second development is the organisation of the State People’s Muslim League. There can of course be no objection to this organisation as such. But its Policies make it dangerous to the national and democratic movement. It is closely associated with the movement of the Khaksars. The League’s attitude to the problem of the States is a contradictory one. In States with Hindu rulers but with a predominantly Muslim population the League is the champion of democratic rights. In States with Muslim rulers but with Hindu Subjects the League and its ancillary organisations send or promise to send thousands of volunteers for the preservation of autocracy and the suppression of popular movement. 5
There is one other aspect of the League’s politics which must be mentioned here. The League has not always spoken with the same voice. Its policy has been dual. While extremism has been running riot on the one hand with Mr. Jinnah as the spearhead, a conciliatory gesture and a more moderate approach have not been wanting. During the years the Congress has been in office, then and afterwards, the League has responded to several efforts for a settlement of the communal problem. These efforts have all ended in failure, and the reasons must be understood.
The League has always insisted on an impossible pre-condition for any negotiations with the Congress. It has claimed that it should be recognised as "the sole and authoritative" organisation of the Muslims of India. The implications of the claim must not be missed; It means no less than that the Indian National Congress should commit political suicide. It is a demand that the Congress should abandon unchivalrously the large numbers of Muslims on its roles, the Shias, the Momins, the Ahrars and the large masses who are behind the Azad Conference, to the tender mercies of the League, to be represented or misrepresented by it. Obviously the claim of a political party to be representative of a religious group in a totalitarian way cannot be admitted without grave injury to the State. The admission of such a claim involves the creation of an imperium in imperio. It would be to set up, as it were, two kinds of empires, each claiming to be representative of a religious community. Besides such a claim can be justified democratically only when the masses of Muslims and Hindus have pronounced their confidence in the League or the Congress. In the presence of other parties such a claim is certainly an usurpation of democratic rights. The results of the election of 1937 and the growth of nationalist Muslim opinion and other evidences prove conclusively that the League’s claim cannot be sustained. The Congress quite rightly refused to arrogate to itself a function which belongs to the body of Muslims in the country. But it went as far as it could go, perhaps more than it should have done, and was willing to recognise the League as the most important of the Muslim organisations in the country. But the League was not satisfied. It was unwilling to negotiate on any other terms than its own. This claim to be representative of the entire mass of Muslims in the country without a willingness to submit that claim to them displays once again the aversion of the Muslim League to the masses and democratic principles, and brings out its true character as predominantly an organisation of the upper middle classes. It is further a sure indication of the unwillingness for an agreement.
Nor is this all. The problem to be negotiated has never been fully stated by the League. Its demands have been vague. Illustrative demands have been referred to.6But they have never yet been completely formulated. This places the negotiators on behalf of the Congress or any other party in a most awkward position. They have to accept completely unspecified demands, however unreasonable they may be, or admit a breakdown. In the illustrative points alluded to, which have appeared in the Press, there is nothing like a programme which must appear in a predominantly agricultural country with its population on the verge of misery. There is little of economic reform, or even educational reform. The issues that are prominently mentioned are questions of cow-killing, music before mosques, Urdu, the Flag, and representation in local bodies and Legislative assemblies, and above all jobs in the public services. The percentages demanded bear absolutely no proportion to the numbers of the population. With a programme that lays little emphasis on political advance or economic reform, it is not a matter for surprise that a party laying every emphasis on independence and economic freedom for the masses finds it exceedingly difficult to come to an agreement. If the fundamental objectives of freedom, economic advancement, democracy and a common political life were admitted by the League in word and deed, a settlement with it would perhaps have come a long while ago and we should not be left an unsolved communal problem today.
This brief review of the politics of the League makes it easy to understand its present position. The Lahore resolution of the League reiterates its rejection of the Government of India Act of 1935, and urges firstly that the whole constitutional problem should be examined de novo at the end of the present war, secondly that "no revised plan of constitution would be acceptable to the Muslims unless it is framed with their approval and consent" and finally that the new constitution of India must be based on the basic principles contained in the following words of the Resolution: -
"Resolved that it is the considered view of this session of the All-India Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principles, namely, geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial adjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are in a majority as in the north-western and north-eastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute "independent States" in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign, and that adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards should be provided in the constitutions for minorities in the units and in the regions for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them; and in other parts of India where the Mussalmans are in a minority, adequate, effective, and mandatory safeguards shall be specifically provided in the constitution for them and other minorities for the protection of their religious cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them.
"This session further authorises the Working Committee to frame a scheme of constitution in accordance with those basic principles providing for the assumption finally by the respective regions of all the powers such as defence, external affairs, communications, customs and such other matters as may be necessary." 7
The Committee set up by the League has not yet reported. The details of the scheme of constitution therefore remain vague. But the main outlines of a constitution based on the principles set off in the Resolution, may easily be guessed. The basic principles are two. The first is the division of India into zones inhabited predominantly by populations of one or the other of the two faiths, Islam and Hinduism, the north-western and north-eastern and the rest. "Two zones are mentioned, but more are hinted at. Whatever is left out after the Muslim zones are carved out will presumably form the Hindu zone. The zones will be "autonomous and sovereign" controlling every function of the government, such as defence, foreign affairs, customs, communications and others. They will inherit the powers of the present Central Government. No common organisation is contemplated for the whole of India. The zones are not to be sub-federations within a Federation of All-India as had been earlier proposed by some of the League’s spokesmen. They are to be independent and to treat with one another as such. The present Provinces will continue as autonomous units of the zones, instead of being autonomous units of an All-India Federation as at present. To make the majorities of the Muslims and Hindus effective the necessary territorial adjustments will be made.
The second principle is that of "adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards" to be devised in consultation with the different minorities in the different zones and embodied in the constitution. These concern the "religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests" of the minorities. The Resolution of the League demands these safe-guards for the Muslim minorities in the non-Muslim zones and promises them for the minorities within the Muslim zones.
Certain obvious lacunae of the scheme must be pointed out here. There is no mention of the place to be accorded to the States, which constitute one of the most intractable of the problems of the maker of our future constitution. How are the States to be fitted into the zonal scheme? Would they be content to exchange the paramountcy of the British Government for that of the zonal Governments? What will be the relationship of the States to the zonal Governments? Will the rulers of the States and their peoples have no say in determining their future and the future of India?
The fundamental reason for putting forward the scheme of division is that the Hindus and Muslims constitute separate and mutually exclusive civilizations and that they are two nations with no affinities between themselves. No common political life is therefore possible for them. A common political life is therefore possible for them. A common political life, it is asserted, would lead to a permanent domination of the Muslims by the Hindus. The result, it is prophesied, would be the creation of "a Hindu totalitarian regime," and "the destruction of the States, Muslim civilisation and British commerce."8 Mr. Jinnah who has raised these extraordinary fears therefore claims for the Muslims the right of self-determination and separate homelands for the Muslim nation.
Self-determination in any comprehensible sense must mean the decision by the people directly through a plebiscite or indirectly through their chosen representatives on any issue. But the self-determination claimed by Mr. Jinnah is not of this character. The League is against any process of election by the Indian people or even by the Muslims in a separate electorate even though it claims to represent them. The League speaks for the Muslims as their "sole and authoritative organisation". The voice of Mr. Jinnah is the voice of the League and therefore of the Muslims.
Nor is this all. A people cannot claim an unqualified right of self-determination for itself and at the same time deny it to others. The League would not permit the other "nationalities" of India besides the Muslims and the Hindus, and according to the high authority of the report of the Joint Parliamentary Select Committee there are many more of them claiming the exercise of this right which it claims for the Muslims. To admit such a right would necessarily mean the splitting up of India, Muslim as well as Hindu, into a hundred bits. A political fragmentation of the country, comparable in appearance to the economic fragmentation of agricultural holdings with which we are familiar, will be the inevitable result of such an admission. Logically, if we are to have Pakistans and Hindustans, we must also have Khalsasthan, Jatistan, Aboriginestan and Dravidnad for which other "nations" in India have already voiced a demand for which other "nations" in India have already voiced a demand at "representative" gatherings!
The second of the principles postulates that the safeguards for the minorities must be devised in consultation with them. No idea of the kind of safeguards to be so provided has, however, been given. Perhaps the detailed constitutional scheme of the League will formulate them. There is no way out suggested for the not unlikely contingency of a minority taking an attitude of intransigence and pressing the most extravagant claims. When the League rejects categorically majority rule, even when the majority assures it safeguards of its own choosing–why should not the minorities in the Muslim zones take a leaf out of the book of the League’s politics and do the same? The minorities in the zones may well insist on their right of self-determination. They may want rights which negate the principle of majority rule. In the case of the zones it is certain that the majorities will be based on religious grouping and the majorities will be more absolute. The minorities therefore with more reason than the League may refuse to be bound by the decisions of the majorities; and they may refuse arbitration. Will the League coerce these recalcitrant minorities?
It might appear strange that a scheme for the partition of the country which has been long united into a number of independent and sovereign states should have been put forward at a time when the doctrine of the sovereign State has plunged a whole continent, professing a single faith, into anarchy, reduced its villages and cities into shambles, caused untold misery to millions by the barbarities of scientific warfare, and threaten to engulf the whole of civilisation. But Pakistan is a vision. Visions lead to strange courses. They often run counter to reason and commonsense and the hard realities of life. This is partly responsible for this reversion to the politics of the Middle Ages. Lest this be thought an unwarranted assertion, we quote the Maharaja of Mahamudabad, addressing the Bombay Provincial Muslim League conference:
"The State will conform to the laws laid down in Islam. It will deal justly and fairly with every community and every section of its constituent members. The unchangeable laws of Islam will ipso facto be applied and enforced. There will be no fresh legislation in regard to them because Islam has already legislated for them for ever and ever."...."There will be prohibition, absolute and rigorous, with no chance for its being withdrawn. Usury will be abolished. Zakat will be levied. Why should not we be allowed to make this experiment? In treading this path we shall not be crossing the path of any right-minded individual. Sikhs, Hindus, and Christians will benefit equally from beneficent, all pervading activities of this democratic theocratic state." 9
If one thing is established by history it is the inherent antithesis of democracy and theocracy. Theocracies in history have been the most odious of tyrannies and personal freedom is impossible under them. The "all-pervading activities" of the theocracy make it a spying, moral inquisitor, and makes the individual truly a slave. The theocracy of Turkey, no less than the Consistory of Calvin at Geneva, had perpetrated the worst horrors in the name of religion. Still the Maharaja Saheb would urge that democracy and theocracy are possible at the same time, and would hold up the ideal of Pakistan.
Can one escape the feeling that the League is either out of touch with the realities of the modern world or is consciously misleading the public? Crowds ate unfortunately not trained to view things critically. But it is certainly the duty of political parties and their responsible leaders not to mislead the public with the promise of unrealisable millenniums. It is a pity that the Maharaja Saheb did not look around him when he eloquently explained the beauties of Pakistan for the conditions prevailing in independent Muslim States or nearer home to the Provinces where the Muslim League has been in power for well over three years. Why has Turkey discarded the Khalifate? Why have not Egypt, Turkey, Persia, Iraq, Afghanistan and other Muslim States dispensed with Legislative bodies if Islam has legislated for ever? Why do the governments of these countries send out their best young men to European Universities for the study of western Law? (The writer happens to know some of these students personally)? And why do their statue books get filled up with fresh legislation if Islam has legislated for all times? Why have not the Punjab and Bengal introduced Prohibition even as an experiment or suppressed usury and why have the spokesmen of the League been vehement opponents of Prohibition in other Provinces of India?
The resolution of the League came as a surprise to many people in this country. But really there need have been no surprise at all. It flows logically from the initial premises of the League’s politics during the last few years. Pakistan has been a sword of Damocles hanging over the head of Indian nationalism for well over a decade. It is the logical end of the League’s separatism, and the rejection of a common political life for India. Nor again could the constitutional machinery of the separate electorate, first introduced in 1909 by the Minto-Morley Reforms, and since expanded to cut up the Indian people on the basis of religion, race, business and profession by the Communal Award of 1932, have led to any other consequence. The division of India has been implicit in it.
Mr. Jinnah has proclaimed that at last an ideal to live for and die for has been found. He urges a "fight to the last ditch" to achieve it. Pakistan is the salvation of the Muslims and the one and the only solution of the vexed question of minorities. It is a desperate remedy to be achieved by means equally desperate. Mr. Jinnah offers us the alternatives of Pakistan and the complete surrender of the rest of India to his demand or threatens a "reign of chaos," neither of which can be contemplated with equanimity.
If on the one hand Mr. Jinnah and his ardent followers announce Pakistan with the fervour of prophecy, on the other hand a section of the League–true to the dualism of its policies in the past-extends the hand of fellowship and conciliation to the Hindus. Evidence is not wanting to show that either the scheme is put forward as a weapon for bargaining a communal settlement or that a large section of the League have come to realise the dangers inherent in the scheme and its utter impossibility. The Premier of Bengal, Mr. Huq, who moved the Resolution on Pakistan at Lahore has said recently at a meeting in Malabar that it is "merely a suggestion." He has urged a conference of the Premiers of the Provinces to solve the communal problem and find a way out of the present constitutional deadlock. In his latest utterances he has pleaded for the unity of the country in this hour of peril. The Prime Minister of the Punjab has made a similar proposal for a small conference for the solution of our constitutional difficulties and has put forward a most eloquent plea for unity as the means of saving our liberties. It is inconceivable that these distinguished statesmen could think of the possibility of the co-operation of the Congress or other parties in India without the frank acceptance of the unity of the country.
If we set aside Pakistan for the moment, what is it that the League stands for concretely? Firstly it stands for an assured share of political power in the future government of India, and a share of the spoils of office of every kind. Secondly it desires the religion, language (Urdu) and the culture of the Muslims to be adequately and effectively safeguarded by constitutional guarantees. Thirdly it asserts as a means to this end that the present constitution of India should be revised de novo and the constitutional plan for the future must have the consent and approval of the Muslims of India.
The moderate section of the League would probably accept a system of fundamental rights including the provision for the places of the minorities in the Legislatures, local bodies and public services of the country. It desires its majorities to be preserved in the Provinces of Bengal and Punjab but at the same time claims a weightage for the Muslims in the Provinces where they are in a minority. It seems to prefer the largest possible autonomy for the constituent Provinces of India with the residuary powers vested in the Provinces and a due share for Muslims in the central government of an all-India Federation. It desires further the opportunities of co-operation between the Muslim Zone Province for mutual purposes, an attenuated form of the Pakistan.
If such a programme does not compromise the unity of India as a whole, which is the indispensable condition of winning and maintaining our freedom, if the safeguards claimed do not constitute a patent injustice to the other communities, and if the approval and consent of the Muslim mean the consent and approval of the elected representatives of Indian Muslims, then there is hardly anything in this programme to which other parties in the country could not agree. The matter would be capable of adjustment round a table between the representatives of the parties or of the people.
But the issues are never presented in this wise. The mood that is dominant is the extremist one and we see the League insisting on the rejection of a common political life and on the division of India. The approval and consent of the Muslims of India is made to mean simply the desires of the leaders of the Muslim League. The League forbids the British Government to make a declaration of India’s free status till it pleases the small group of leaders dominating it. This attitude can be described in the words of Mr. Jinnah himself on a former occasion as the attempt of the tail to wag the head of the dog. It raises serious and vital questions. Has a party even assuming that it is fully representative of a particular community, which is a minority and which is assured every reasonable safeguard for its future, a right to veto the political progress of the country? To admit the claim of the League to prevent the constitutional evolution of India unless its extravagant claims are met is really to "enthrone intimidation in the seats of power" and to throw aside both courage and principle for fear of alienating a few in pursuing the interests of the vast majority. When it is seen that the party claiming this extraordinary power is not in fact even fully representative of the Muslims of India, whom it professes to represent, it is obvious that the claim is utterly untenable.
In the politics and programme of the League, it has been already remarked, is a stranger dualism; It states its objective to be the complete freedom of India, "a free Islam in a free India,"–but it opposes the grant of freedom and celebrates a day of deliverance when the flame of self-government is extinguished in the greater part of India. It calls for communal harmony and urges the need of unity, but talks of the two nations, and advocates the vivisection of India. It prides itself on the democracy of Islam, but is intolerant of dissent from its own opinions by the followers of Islam, and refuses to take its mandate from the people, the very Muslims whom it claims to represent, and opposes the Constituent Assembly or any other democratic procedure for framing the future constitution. It advertises its deep concern for the masses but its programmes display scant appreciation of the pressing problem of these masses, of poverty and unemployment and a preoccupation with places in the public services and percentages in the Legislatures, and religious grievances. It professes to scorn the Charka and non-violence as antiquated, but itself perfers a medieval theocratic ideal. It talks of the strength of the ninety millions of Muslims–no one in his senses will doubt that, safeguards or no safeguards, they are and will be powerful–but it appeals to Britain to recognise the leadership of the League and to have confidence in it. It protests its, nationalism, but is unwilling to march in line with the forces of nationalism, and prefers to co-operate with its deadly enemy.
1 The analysis of the return of the Provincial Elections of 1937 are as follows: -
Provinces | Elected on the League Ticket. | Total Muslim seats. |
Madras | 10 | 28 |
Bombay | 20 | 29 |
Bengal | 39 | 117 |
United Provinces | 27 | 64 |
Punjab | 1 | 84 |
Bihar | Nil | 39 |
Central Provinces | Nil | 14 |
Assam | 9 | 34 |
N. W. F. Province | Nil | 36 |
Orissa | Nil | 4 |
Sind | Nil | 36 |
Total | 106 | 485 |
Because of subsequent changes of party and of dual allegiance that several members owe, the strength of the League is greater than the figures indicate. But it is not enough to substantiate the League’s claim to be the sole and authoritative representative of the Muslims of India. It is significant that in the overwhelmingly Muslim Zones the League’s hold is not very high.
Lord Zetland observed that only a few Muslims had been elected on the Congress ticket. The noble Lord and indeed the whole body of official India seem to ignore the opinions of the vast number of independent Muslims returned at the last Provincial elections who are fundamentally at one with the Congress. (Zetland’s speech in Parliament, November, 1939.)
2 Mr. Jinnah: article in ‘Time and Tide.’
3 Jinnah: ibid.
No comments:
Post a Comment